Commits
- Commit:
9a8e357c727600cb61ac6ec4c83259fa6d9a3081
- From:
- Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>
- Date:
gotd: implement the delete-refs capability
Allow clients to run "got send -d" against gotd. Clients will send a
zero-id as new id for a reference and, in the special but more common
case of just deleting and not updating, no pack file will be sent.
ok and tweaks by stsp@
- Commit:
a2c12f7b814f145ba507667dbf640253c87c3460
- From:
- Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>
- Date:
delete trailing whitespaces
- Commit:
f3dfebfc3bdd798342b4e7bde241e613af75efd8
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
make read errors in gotsh serve_write() fatal, as was done for serve_read()
- Commit:
9aeaf23a7e94501bdcb20d18427620cf70b87995
- From:
- Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>
- Date:
gotsh: validate with parse_command before connecting
Export parse_command (now got_serve_parse_command) from lib/serve.c and
use it to validate the command line in gotsh instead of just checking
that the -c argument starts with 'git-receive-pack' or 'git-upload-pack'.
Invalid usage now always fails before opening the socket, while before
it wasn't always the case. This also means that invalid usage doesn't
count towards the limits.
ok jamsek, stsp
- Commit:
c808f450905feb2890b615ba1aeedb565e3fdd57
- From:
- Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>
- Date:
fmt; fold long line
- Commit:
96afb0d62311dd459395b8eba2216094c18dfb67
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
make read errors in gotsh serve_read() fatal and adjust tests accordingly
ok jamsek
- Commit:
f91b5c433d4c2fb2e80053859b6f15c9239b3231
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
only "forward" implicit flush packets in serve_read() if they are expected
ok jamsek
- Commit:
fecfd5bc4d412263e1178f9b6edf69709ea6e273
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
fix spurious "gotsh: unexpected flush packet" error when client is up-to-date
ok op@
- Commit:
f9550d472ec2151070b5bef2bd3b950d9f8e7949
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
fix an issue where gotd fails to accept multiple have-lines from clients
ok op, jamsek
- Commit:
00b3e9ae14f04a45f1ca7445bade6b41a6e8a1c5
- From:
- Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>
- Date:
replace malloc+memcpy with strndup. no functional change intended
ok stsp@
- Commit:
d10629e6628f13c08f5b6013d0f1b68630acc383
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
remove bogus abort() call from gotsh echo_error()
- Commit:
2ff9f0818d453fcbfcf4843b368604f277cf4458
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
fix capabilities announced by gotsh when no reference exist in repository
ok op@
- Commit:
c6b5adb85da13d21aa8937805dce16fedb07272b
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
fix sending of capabilities from gotsh(1) in case repository has no refs
- Commit:
758dc042e8fc2399dc58d96ce6d80b4a0adf4705
- From:
- Josiah Frentsos <jfrent@tilde.team>
- Via:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
remove trailing whitespace; patch by Josiah Frentsos
- Commit:
1c9d898d6c7c6c8681e8e191ebe2c01b8d066f6e
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
avoid incomplete writes of buffered pack file chunks in gotsh
- Commit:
86769de8751a920ee4288ec91157066d6f098bfc
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
remove sendfd pledge promise from gotd repo_read process
Have the parent process send one end of the pipe directly to gotsh(1),
such that repo_write can run without "sendfd".
Combining "sendfd" and "recvfd" in the same process is frowned upon.
ok tracey
- Commit:
7fec5f4ad5baecf5bab9d872a925055270b2cf53
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
remove sendfd pledge promise from gotd repo_write process
Have the parent process send one end of the pipe directly to gotsh(1),
such that repo_write can run without "sendfd".
Combining "sendfd" and "recvfd" in the same process is frowned upon.
ok tracey
- Commit:
13b2bc374c1870ec27b2eeb40efe68fd465f64bb
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Date:
introduce gotd(8), a Git repository server reachable via ssh(1)
This is an initial barebones implementation which provides the absolute
minimum of functionality required to serve got(1) and git(1) clients.
Basic fetch/send functionality has been tested and seems to work here,
but this server is not yet expected to be stable.
More testing is welcome. See the man pages for setup instructions.
The current design uses one reader and one writer process per repository,
which will have to be extended to N readers and N writers in the future.
At startup, each process will chroot(2) into its assigned repository.
This works because gotd(8) can only be started as root, and will then
fork+exec, chroot, and privdrop.
At present the parent process runs with the following pledge(2) promises:
"stdio rpath wpath cpath proc getpw sendfd recvfd fattr flock unix unveil"
The parent is the only process able to modify the repository in a way
that becomes visible to Git clients. The parent uses unveil(2) to
restrict its view of the filesystem to /tmp and the repositories
listed in the configuration file gotd.conf(5).
Per-repository chroot(2) processes use "stdio rpath sendfd recvfd".
The writer defers to the parent for modifying references in the
repository to point at newly uploaded commits. The reader is fine
without such help, because Git repositories can be read without
having to create any lock-files.
gotd(8) requires a dedicated user ID, which should own repositories
on the filesystem, and a separate secondary group, which should not
have filesystem-level repository access, and must be allowed access
to the gotd(8) socket.
To obtain Git repository access, users must be members of this
secondary group, and must have their login shell set to gotsh(1).
gotsh(1) connects to the gotd(8) socket and speaks Git-protocol
towards the client on the other end of the SSH connection.
gotsh(1) is not an interactive command shell.
At present, authenticated clients are granted read/write access to
all repositories and all references (except for the "refs/got/" and
the "refs/remotes/" namespaces, which are already being protected
from modification).
While complicated access control mechanism are not a design goal,
making it possible to safely offer anonymous Git repository access
over ssh(1) is on the road map.