Commits
- Commit:
db6421918d528a8d1b0670409025c43ee4aa52ce
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Via:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
add support for reading blobs to object_open_io.c
- Commit:
4efc8dcb177f6c378c12a7d91f51e6ae4e80078b
- From:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
portable: gotd/gitwrapper: update for libs
Bring gotd and gitwrapper closer to how libraries are detected.
- Commit:
6d7eb4f7d125c942358a1f8edf1d350e74141112
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Via:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
add support for protecting references against 'got send -f' to gotd
ok op@
- Commit:
4fccd2fe0ffbbc668b66abe63614470635f92f1b
- From:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
portable: configure: split out dependencies
Rather than assume all dependencies are required for all programs, split
them out.
This will make packaging easier, as well as splitting the code to use
subprojects.
Note that due to the use of config.h semantics, in most cases the
got_compat.h header file is now at the top of the .c file it is included
in, so that it can handle the system header inclusion properly.
- Commit:
98670ba726486c39efff220ab1e074c62023aae7
- From:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
portable: rework SHA detection
Simply the SHA detection by not predicating on libcrypto, but instead
checking individual header files.
- Commit:
4680f704353811c8bb6ce65eac3714d1bd200c26
- From:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
portable: remove sha1.h; found portably
Remove sha1.h as this is found portably across systems.
- Commit:
588a8092bc282294ee23585991e81586905a8fd4
- From:
- Omar Polo <op@omarpolo.com>
- Via:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
include sha2.h too where sha1.h is included
In preparation for wide sha256 support; stsp@ agrees. Change done
mechanically with
find . -iname \*.[cy] -exec sam {} +
X ,x/<sha1\.h>/i/\n#include <sha2.h>
- Commit:
ab9f7b873117a319d9223952c7911c1526173410
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Via:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
fix tempfile handling in gotd's got_object_raw_open()
There was a bug where we reused a file stored in *outfd from a
previous call, resulting in a raw object backed by a file but
with tempfile_idx -1. This then caused bad confusion during
deltification. Fix this by passing tempfd to read_raw() functions
and only setting *outfd in case it is actually required, and
returning tempfd to the repository tempfile pool otherwise.
ok tracey
- Commit:
ebe6ec920b98ddf1b63687d78857f37af34b691f
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Via:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
use a caller-specified size limit for mapped files in got_object_raw_alloc()
Without this we end up being confused about whether a raw object has
been mapped into memory, leading to crashes.
ok op@
- Commit:
b296ac1cb14cdee2765af4e41089c118062279d1
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Via:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
fix *size not being passed out of read_packed_object_raw()
ok op@
- Commit:
3efd8e3122b7d03a046d23fd5eed22c1b78f8ceb
- From:
- Stefan Sperling <stsp@stsp.name>
- Via:
- Thomas Adam <thomas@xteddy.org>
- Date:
introduce gotd(8), a Git repository server reachable via ssh(1)
This is an initial barebones implementation which provides the absolute
minimum of functionality required to serve got(1) and git(1) clients.
Basic fetch/send functionality has been tested and seems to work here,
but this server is not yet expected to be stable.
More testing is welcome. See the man pages for setup instructions.
The current design uses one reader and one writer process per repository,
which will have to be extended to N readers and N writers in the future.
At startup, each process will chroot(2) into its assigned repository.
This works because gotd(8) can only be started as root, and will then
fork+exec, chroot, and privdrop.
At present the parent process runs with the following pledge(2) promises:
"stdio rpath wpath cpath proc getpw sendfd recvfd fattr flock unix unveil"
The parent is the only process able to modify the repository in a way
that becomes visible to Git clients. The parent uses unveil(2) to
restrict its view of the filesystem to /tmp and the repositories
listed in the configuration file gotd.conf(5).
Per-repository chroot(2) processes use "stdio rpath sendfd recvfd".
The writer defers to the parent for modifying references in the
repository to point at newly uploaded commits. The reader is fine
without such help, because Git repositories can be read without
having to create any lock-files.
gotd(8) requires a dedicated user ID, which should own repositories
on the filesystem, and a separate secondary group, which should not
have filesystem-level repository access, and must be allowed access
to the gotd(8) socket.
To obtain Git repository access, users must be members of this
secondary group, and must have their login shell set to gotsh(1).
gotsh(1) connects to the gotd(8) socket and speaks Git-protocol
towards the client on the other end of the SSH connection.
gotsh(1) is not an interactive command shell.
At present, authenticated clients are granted read/write access to
all repositories and all references (except for the "refs/got/" and
the "refs/remotes/" namespaces, which are already being protected
from modification).
While complicated access control mechanism are not a design goal,
making it possible to safely offer anonymous Git repository access
over ssh(1) is on the road map.